Generalized second price auction in multi-path routing with selfish nodes

Authors:
Xueyuan Su;Sammy Chan;Gang Peng
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT;Department of Electronic Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong;Department of Electronic Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
Venue:
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
Year:
2009

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Abstract

We model the multi-path routing with selfish nodes as an auction and provide a novel solution from the gametheoretical perspective. By adapting the idea of generalized second price (GSP) payment originating from Internet advertising business and developing pertinent policies for multi-hop networks, we design a mechanism that results in Nash equilibria rather than the traditional strategyproofness, which alleviates the over-payment problem of the widely used Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) payment mechanism. We first provide rigorous theoretical analysis of the proposed mechanism, showing the equilibrium behavior and bounds of the over-payment alleviation, and then evaluate the effectiveness of this protocol through extensive simulations.