Auction in multi-path multi-hop routing

Authors:
Xueyuan Su;Sammy Chan;Gang Peng
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science, Yale University;Department of Electronic Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR, China;Department of Electronic Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR, China
Venue:
IEEE Communications Letters
Year:
2009

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Abstract

We model the multi-path multi-hop routing in networks with selfish nodes as an auction and provide a novel solution from the game-theoretical perspective. We design a mechanism that results in Nash equilibria rather than the traditional strategyproofness, which alleviates the overpayment problem of the widely used VCG mechanism. Through theoretical analysis, the proposed protocol is shown to be effective.