The design and analysis of algorithms
The design and analysis of algorithms
The Price of Truth: Frugality in Truthful Mechanisms
STACS '03 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Asymptotically optimal repeated auctions for sponsored search
Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce
Matroids, secretary problems, and online mechanisms
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Maximizing Non-Monotone Submodular Functions
FOCS '07 Proceedings of the 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Auctions for structured procurement
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Ascending auctions for integral (poly)matroids with concave nondecreasing separable values
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
An online mechanism for ad slot reservations with cancellations
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
The intractability of computing the minimum distance of a code
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Revenue maximization with a single sample
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
From convex optimization to randomized mechanisms: toward optimal combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Mechanism design via correlation gap
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Simple, optimal and efficient auctions
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Revenue optimization in the generalized second-price auction
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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We introduce revenue submodularity, the property that market expansion has diminishing returns on an auction's expected revenue. We prove that revenue submodularity is generally possible only in matroid markets, that Bayesian-optimal auctions are always revenue-submodular in such markets, and that the VCG mechanism is revenue-submodular in matroid markets with i.i.d bidders and "sufficient competition". We also give two applications of revenue submodularity: good approximation algorithms for novel market expansion problems, and approximate revenue guarantees for the VCG mechanism with i.i.d bidders.