Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Matroids, secretary problems, and online mechanisms
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Auctions for structured procurement
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A combinatorial allocation mechanism with penalties for banner advertising
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
Temporary and Permanent Buyout Prices in Online Auctions
Management Science
Finding graph matchings in data streams
APPROX'05/RANDOM'05 Proceedings of the 8th international workshop on Approximation, Randomization and Combinatorial Optimization Problems, and Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Randamization and Computation: algorithms and techniques
Selling ad campaigns: online algorithms with cancellations
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithms for Secretary Problems on Graphs and Hypergraphs
ICALP '09 Proceedings of the 36th Internatilonal Collogquium on Automata, Languages and Programming: Part II
SOFA: Strategyproof Online Frequency Allocation for Multihop Wireless Networks
ISAAC '09 Proceedings of the 20th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation
Randomized Online Algorithms for the Buyback Problem
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Balanced allocation with succinct representation
Proceedings of the 16th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Buyback problem: approximate matroid intersection with cancellation costs
ICALP'11 Proceedings of the 38th international colloquim conference on Automata, languages and programming - Volume Part I
Online mechanism design for electric vehicle charging
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
TOFU: semi-truthful online frequency allocation mechanism for wireless network
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Secretary problems: laminar matroid and interval scheduling
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Evaluation of Parking Reservation System with Auction Including Electricity Trading
WI-IAT '12 Proceedings of the The 2012 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 03
Whole-page optimization and submodular welfare maximization with online bidders
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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Many advertisers (bidders) use Internet systems to buy display advertisements on publishers' webpages or on traditional media such as radio, TV and newsprint. They seek a simple, online mechanism to reserve ad slots in advance. On the other hand, media publishers (sellers) represent a vast and varying inventory, and they too seek automatic, online mechanisms for pricing and allocating such reservations. We propose and study a simple model for auctioning such ad slot reservations in advance. A seller will display a set of slots at some point T in the future. Until T, bidders arrive sequentially and place a bid on the slots they are interested in. The seller must decide immediately whether or not to grant a reservation. Our model allows the seller to cancel at any time any reservation made earlier, in which case the holder of the reservation incurs a utility loss amounting to a fraction of her value for the reservation and may also receive a cancellation fee from the seller. Our main result is an online mechanism for allocation and pricing in this model with many desirable game-theoretic properties. It is individually rational. Winners have an incentive to be honest and bidding one's true value dominates any lower bid. Further, it bounds the earnings of speculators who are in the game to obtain the cancellation fees. The mechanism in addition has optimization guarantees. Its revenue is within a constant fraction of the a posteriori revenue of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism which is known to be truthful (in the offline case). Our mechanism's efficiency is within a constant fraction of the a posteriori optimally efficient solution. If efficiency also takes into account the utility losses of bidders whose reservation was canceled, we show that our mechanism matches (for appropriate values of the parameters) an upper bound on the competitive ratio of any deterministic online algorithm. Our mechanism's technical core is a variant of the online weighted bipartite matching problem where unlike prior variants in which one randomizes edge arrivals or bounds edge weights, we may revoke previously committed edges. Our results make no assumptions about bidders' arrival order or value distribution. They still hold if we replace items with elements of a matroid and matchings with independent sets, or if all bidders have additive value for a set of items.