Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
Theoretical Computer Science
Mechanism design for online real-time scheduling
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Online auctions with re-usable goods
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithmic Game Theory
Scheduling: Theory, Algorithms, and Systems
Scheduling: Theory, Algorithms, and Systems
An online mechanism for ad slot reservations with cancellations
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Self-correcting sampling-based dynamic multi-unit auctions
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An ironing-based approach to adaptive online mechanism design in single-valued domains
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Speed bumps ahead for electric-vehicle charging
IEEE Spectrum
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Multiattribute auctions based on generalized additive independence
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A multi-agent platform for auction-based allocation of loads in transportation logistics
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
Algorithms and mechanisms for procuring services with uncertain durations using redundancy
Artificial Intelligence
Deploying power grid-integrated electric vehicles as a multi-agent system
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Online mechanism design for electric vehicle charging
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Theoretical and practical foundations of large-scale agent-based micro-storage in the smart grid
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
A model-based online mechanism with pre-commitment and its application to electric vehicle charging
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Two-sided online markets for electric vehicle charging
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We develop an online mechanism for the allocation of an expiring resource to a dynamic agent population. Each agent has a non-increasing marginal valuation function for the resource, and an upper limit on the number of units that can be allocated in any period. We propose two versions on a truthful allocation mechanism. Each modifies the decisions of a greedy online assignment algorithm by sometimes cancelling an allocation of resources. One version makes this modification immediately upon an allocation decision while a second waits until the point at which an agent departs the market. Adopting a prior-free framework, we show that the second approach has better worst-case allocative efficiency and is more scalable. On the other hand, the first approach (with immediate cancellation) may be easier in practice because it does not need to reclaim units previously allocated. We consider an application to recharging plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs). Using data from a real-world trial of PHEVs in the UK, we demonstrate higher system performance than a fixed price system, performance comparable with a standard, but non-truthful scheduling heuristic, and the ability to support 50% more vehicles at the same fuel cost than a simple randomized policy.