Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On Convex Minimization over Base Polytopes
IPCO '07 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An Ascending Vickrey Auction for Selling Bases of a Matroid
Operations Research
On multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
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Consider a seller with a fixed set of resources that can produce a variety of bundles from a set E of indivisible goods. Several bidders are interested in purchasing a bundle of such goods. Their utility for a bundle is privately known and represented by an additively separable, nondecreasing and concave function. In the case when the set of feasible bundles forms an integral polymatroid (or its basis), we present an ascending auction which in equilibrium returns the efficient outcome. Formally, given an integral, monotone, submodular function ρ: E → N0 with ρ(θ) = 0 the integral points of the polymatroid Pρ represent various allocations which the seller can feasibly offer. Buyers j ∈ N have privately known valuations vj (xj) for xj ∈ Pρ with the property that vj (xj) = Σe∈Evje(xje) where the vje(xje) are nondecreasing and concave. We present an ascending auction running in pseudo-polynomial time in which truthful bidding is an ex post equilibrium and results in the efficient outcome. Our auction strictly generalizes the ascending auction of Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986) applied to scheduling matroids (agents want to schedule several jobs; their due and release dates are common knowledge, but the value of completing a job is private information). For a suitable class of uniform matroids, our auction reduces to the ascending auction of Ausubel (2004) for the allocation of multiple units of a homogeneous good when agents have decreasing marginal values in quantities. Finally, our auction can be applied to the setting of spatially distributed markets considered in Babaioff, Nisan, and Pavlov (2004).