Introduction to algorithms
Network flows: theory, algorithms, and applications
Network flows: theory, algorithms, and applications
Combinatorial auctions for supply chain formation
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Concurrent auctions across the supply chain
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
INFORMS Journal on Computing
ICE: an iterative combinatorial exchange
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Passive verification of the strategyproofness of mechanisms in open environments
ICEC '06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Electronic commerce: The new e-commerce: innovations for conquering current barriers, obstacles and limitations to conducting successful business on the internet
Agent Competition Double-Auction Mechanism
Management Science
Generalized trade reduction mechanisms
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Trading networks with price-setting agents
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Ascending auctions for integral (poly)matroids with concave nondecreasing separable values
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truthful Bundle/Multiunit Double Auctions
Management Science
Concurrent auctions across the supply chain
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Chain: a dynamic double auction framework for matching patient agents
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Public advertisement broker markets
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
An Ascending Vickrey Auction for Selling Bases of a Matroid
Operations Research
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We consider the problem of a spatially distributed market with strategic agents. In this problem a single good is traded in a set of independent markets, where shipment between markets is possible but incurs a cost. The problem has previously been studied in the non-strategic case, inwhich it can be analyzed and solved as a min-cost-flow problem. We considerthe case where buyers and sellers are strategic. Our first result gives adouble characterization of the VCG prices, first as distances in acertain residue graph and second as the minimal (for buyers) and maximal (forsellers) equilibrium prices. This provides a computationally efficient, individually rational and incentive compatible welfare maximizing mechanism. This mechanism is, necessarily, not budget balanced and we provide alsoa budget-balanced mechanism (which is also computationally efficient,incentive compatible, and individually rational) that achieves highwelfare. Some of our results extend to the cases where buyers andsellers have arbitrary convex demand and supply functions and to the case where transportation is controlled by strategic agents as well.