Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on knowledge representation
Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Competitive generalized auctions
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Solving Combinatorial Auctions Using Stochastic Local Search
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Guaranteeing Properties for E-commerce Systems
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
Envy-free auctions for digital goods
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Implementing norms in electronic institutions
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Programming and Verifying Subgame-Perfect Mechanisms
Journal of Logic and Computation
Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions
ICEC '06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Electronic commerce: The new e-commerce: innovations for conquering current barriers, obstacles and limitations to conducting successful business on the internet
On the complexity of practical ATL model checking
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design for scheduling on unrelated machines
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
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Consider an open infrastructure in which anyone can deploy mechanisms to support automated decision making and coordination amongst self-interested computational agents. Strategyproofness is a central property in the design of such mechanisms, allowing participants to maximize their individual benefit by reporting truthful private information about preferences and capabilities and without modeling or reasoning about the behavior of other agents. But, why should participants trust that a mechanism is strategyproof? We address this problem, proposing and describing a passive verifier, able to monitor the inputs and outputs of mechanisms and verify the strategyproofness, or not, of a mechanism. Useful guarantees are available to participants before the behavior of the mechanism is completely known, and metrics are introduced to provide a measure of partial verification. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our method.