Competitive generalized auctions
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions
ESA '02 Proceedings of the 10th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms
Automated bilateral bargaining about multiple attributes in a one-to-many setting
ICEC '04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Electronic commerce
Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Passive verification of the strategyproofness of mechanisms in open environments
ICEC '06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Electronic commerce: The new e-commerce: innovations for conquering current barriers, obstacles and limitations to conducting successful business on the internet
Stepwise randomized combinatorial auctions achieve revenue monotonicity
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Concurrent auctions across the supply chain
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Chain: a dynamic double auction framework for matching patient agents
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
An Online Multi-unit Auction with Improved Competitive Ratio
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Envy-Free Allocations for Budgeted Bidders
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Learning the demand curve in posted-price digital goods auctions
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
No justified complaints: on fair sharing of multiple resources
Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference
The power of fair pricing mechanisms
LATIN'10 Proceedings of the 9th Latin American conference on Theoretical Informatics
On the on-line k-truck problem with benefit maximization
ISAAC'06 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
Multi-attribute bilateral bargaining in a one-to-many setting
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
Prior-free auctions with ordered bidders
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions
Operations Research
Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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We study auctions for a commodity in unlimited supply, e.g., a digital good. In particular we consider three desirable properties for auctions: item Competitive: the auction achieves a constant fraction of the optimal revenue even on worst case inputs. item Truthful: any bidder's best strategy is to bid the maximum value they are willing to pay. item Envy-free: after the auction is run, no bidder would be happier with the outcome of another bidder (for digital good auctions, this means that there is a single sale price and goods are allocated to all bidders willing to pay this price).Our main result is to show that no constant-competitive auction that is truthful and always gives outcomes are envy-free. We consider two relaxations of these requirements, allowing the auction to be untruthful with vanishingly small probability, and allowing the auction to give non-envy-free outcomes with vanishingly small probability. Under both of these relaxations we get competitive auctions.