Flexible double auctions for electionic commerce: theory and implementation
Decision Support Systems - Special issue on economics of electronic commerce
Competitive auctions and digital goods
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
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STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Incentive-compatible online auctions for digital goods
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
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IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Envy-free auctions for digital goods
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Online algorithms for market clearing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
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Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Chain: a dynamic double auction framework for matching patient agents
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
On coordination among multiple auctions
FAW'07 Proceedings of the 1st annual international conference on Frontiers in algorithmics
Is genetic programming "human-competitive"? the case of experimental double auction markets
IDEAL'11 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Intelligent data engineering and automated learning
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MobiHoc '11 Proceedings of the Twelfth ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing
Selling in Exclusive Markets: Some Observations on Prior-Free Mechanism Design
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation - Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory
Optimal revenue-sharing double auctions with applications to ad exchanges
Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on World wide web
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In this paper we consider the problem of designing a mechanism for double auctions where bidders each bid to buy or sell one unit of a single commodity. We assume that each bidder's utility value for the item is private to them and we focus on truthful mechanisms, ones were the bidders' optimal strategy is to bid their true utility. The profit of the auctioneer is the difference between the total payments from buyers and total to the sellers. We aim to maximize this profit. We extend the competitive analysis framework of basic auctions [9] and give an upper bound on the profit of any truthful double auction. We then reduce the competitive double auction problem to basic auctions by showing that any competitive basic auction can be converted into a competitive double auction with a competitive ratio of twice that of the basic auction. In addition, we show that better competitive ratios can be obtained by directly adapting basic auction techniques to the double auction problem. This result provides insight into the design of profit maximizing mechanisms in general.