Competitive auctions and digital goods
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Competitive generalized auctions
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Competitive Auctions for Multiple Digital Goods
ESA '01 Proceedings of the 9th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms
Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions
ESA '02 Proceedings of the 10th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms
Adaptive limited-supply online auctions
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mechanism Design via Machine Learning
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Optimal mechanism design and money burning
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Limited and online supply and the bayesian foundations of prior-free mechanism design
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On random sampling auctions for digital goods
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Revenue maximization with a single sample
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mechanism design via consensus estimates, cross checking, and profit extraction
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
On the competitive ratio of the random sampling auction
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Prior-independent multi-parameter mechanism design
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
On the ratio of revenue to welfare in single-parameter mechanism design
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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We consider prior-free benchmarks in non-matroid settings. In particular, we show that a very desirable benchmark proposed by Hartline and Roughgarden is too strong, in the sense that no truthful mechanism can compete with it even in a very simple non-matroid setting where there are two exclusive markets and the seller can only sell to agents in one of them. On the other hand, we show that there is a mechanism that competes with a symmetrized version of this benchmark. We further investigate the more traditional best fixed price profit benchmark and show that there are mechanisms that compete with it in any downward-closed settings.