Amortized efficiency of list update and paging rules
Communications of the ACM
Randomized algorithms
Online computation and competitive analysis
Online computation and competitive analysis
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Sharing the cost of muliticast transmissions (preliminary version)
STOC '00 Proceedings of the thirty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Competitive auctions and digital goods
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Mechanism Design via Machine Learning
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Truthful auction for CPU time slots
FAW'10 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Frontiers in algorithmics
Envy-free pricing with general supply constraints
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Learning the demand curve in posted-price digital goods auctions
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
How to sell a graph: guidelines for graph retailers
WG'06 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Graph-Theoretic Concepts in Computer Science
On the competitive ratio of the random sampling auction
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Near-optimal pricing in near-linear time
WADS'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Algorithms and Data Structures
On behalf of the seller and society: bicriteria mechanisms for unit-demand auctions
LATIN'06 Proceedings of the 7th Latin American conference on Theoretical Informatics
Buying Cheap Is Expensive: Approximability of Combinatorial Pricing Problems
SIAM Journal on Computing
Selling in Exclusive Markets: Some Observations on Prior-Free Mechanism Design
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation - Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory
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Competitive auctions encourage consumers to bid their utility values while achieving revenue close to that of fixed pricing with perfect market analysis. These auctions were introduced in [6] in the context of selling an unlimited number of copies of a single item (e.g., rights to watch a movie broadcast). In this paper we study the case of multiple items (e.g., concurrent broadcast of several movies). We show auctions that are competitive for this case. The underlying auction mechanisms are more sophisticated than in the single item case, and require solving an interesting optimization problem. Our results are based on a sampling problem that may have other applications.