Point location among hyperplanes and unidirectional ray-shooting
Computational Geometry: Theory and Applications
Competitive Auctions for Multiple Digital Goods
ESA '01 Proceedings of the 9th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms
On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Mechanism Design via Machine Learning
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Approximation algorithms and online mechanisms for item pricing
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Buying cheap is expensive: hardness of non-parametric multi-product pricing
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Item pricing for revenue maximization
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
On the approximability of the maximum feasible subsystem problem with 0/1-coefficients
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Algorithms for Optimal Price Regulations
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
On Hardness of Pricing Items for Single-Minded Bidders
APPROX '09 / RANDOM '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Workshop and 13th International Workshop on Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
On Profit-Maximizing Pricing for the Highway and Tollbooth Problems
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
On Stackelberg Pricing with Computationally Bounded Consumers
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
A quasi-PTAS for profit-maximizing pricing on line graphs
ESA'07 Proceedings of the 15th annual European conference on Algorithms
Bundle pricing with comparable items
ESA'07 Proceedings of the 15th annual European conference on Algorithms
A sublogarithmic approximation for highway and tollbooth pricing
ICALP'10 Proceedings of the 37th international colloquium conference on Automata, languages and programming
Envy-free pricing in multi-item markets
ICALP'10 Proceedings of the 37th international colloquium conference on Automata, languages and programming: Part II
Envy-free pricing with general supply constraints
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
How to sell a graph: guidelines for graph retailers
WG'06 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Graph-Theoretic Concepts in Computer Science
On the hardness of pricing loss-leaders
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Pricing on paths: a PTAS for the highway problem
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Optimal bundle pricing with monotonicity constraint
Operations Research Letters
Buying Cheap Is Expensive: Approximability of Combinatorial Pricing Problems
SIAM Journal on Computing
On the complexity of the highway problem
Theoretical Computer Science
The stackelberg minimum spanning tree game
WADS'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Algorithms and Data Structures
A path-decomposition theorem with applications to pricing and covering on trees
ESA'12 Proceedings of the 20th Annual European conference on Algorithms
Envy-free pricing in multi-item markets
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
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We present efficient approximation algorithms for a number of problems that call for computing the prices that maximize the revenue of the seller on a set of items. Algorithms for such problems enable the design of auctions and related pricing mechanisms [3]. In light of the fact that the problems we address are APX-hard in general [5], we design near-linear and near-cubic time approximation schemes under the assumption that the number of distinct items for sale is constant.