Online computation and competitive analysis
Online computation and competitive analysis
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Competitive auctions and digital goods
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Competitive generalized auctions
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanism Design via Machine Learning
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Multi-unit auctions with unknown supply
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Matroids, secretary problems, and online mechanisms
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Limited and online supply and the bayesian foundations of prior-free mechanism design
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
On the competitive ratio of online sampling auctions
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mechanism design via consensus estimates, cross checking, and profit extraction
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Optimal pricing in social networks with incomplete information
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Limited supply online auctions for revenue maximization
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Selling in Exclusive Markets: Some Observations on Prior-Free Mechanism Design
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation - Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory
On the Competitive Ratio of Online Sampling Auctions
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation - Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory
Competitive auctions for markets with positive externalities
ICALP'13 Proceedings of the 40th international conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We investigate the class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for a set of identical items to bidders who each desire one unit. We adopt the worst-case competitive framework defined by [9, 5] that compares the profit of an auction to that of an optimal single-price sale of least two items. In this paper, we first derive an optimal auction for three items, answering an open question from [8]. Second, we show that the form of this auction is independent of the competitive framework used. Third, we propose a schema for converting a given limited-supply auction into an unlimited supply auction. Applying this technique to our optimal auction for three items, we achieve an auction with a competitive ratio of 3.25, which improves upon the previously best-known competitive ratio of 3.39 from [7]. Finally, we generalize a result from [8] and extend our understanding of the nature of the optimal competitive auction by showing that the optimal competitive auction occasionally offers prices that are higher than all bid values.