Adaptive limited-supply online auctions
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Online auctions and generalized secretary problems
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
On random sampling auctions for digital goods
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the competitive ratio of online sampling auctions
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
On the competitive ratio of the random sampling auction
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
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We consider the design of competitive truthful auctions for prior-free revenue maximization, to sell copies of a single good in limited supply to unit-demand bidders that arrive online. The online model, first studied in [Hajiaghayi, Kleinberg, Parkes, ACM EC 2004] and recently revisited in [Koutsoupias and Pierrakos, WINE 2010], is reminiscent of the secretary problem, in that the order of the bidders' arrival is chosen uniformly at random. The benchmark against which the generated revenue is compared is the one introduced by Goldberg et al. [Games and Economic Behavior 55(2):242---269, 2006]. We consider two variants of limited supply; a hard constraint of k available copies and convex production cost curve for each copy. For each case we present an algorithmic reduction of the problem to the problem of unlimited supply studied by Koutsoupias and Pierrakos. Our reduction for the case of k available copies yields a 26e-competitive auction thus improving significantly upon the best known ratio of 6338, from [Hajiaghayi, Kleinberg, Parkes, ACM EC 2004].