Amortized efficiency of list update and paging rules
Communications of the ACM
Elements of information theory
Elements of information theory
Online computation and competitive analysis
Online computation and competitive analysis
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Reaching Agreement in the Presence of Faults
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Sharing the cost of muliticast transmissions (preliminary version)
STOC '00 Proceedings of the thirty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The Byzantine Generals Problem
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Competitive auctions and digital goods
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Private approximation of NP-hard functions
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Competitive generalized auctions
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Incentive-compatible online auctions for digital goods
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Online learning in online auctions
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions
ESA '02 Proceedings of the 10th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Envy-free auctions for digital goods
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
GROWRANGE: anytime VCG-based mechanisms
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
An Online Multi-unit Auction with Improved Competitive Ratio
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Breaking bidder collusion in large-scale spectrum auctions
Proceedings of the eleventh ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Bayesian optimal no-deficit mechanism design
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Crowdsourced Bayesian auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference
A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Mechanism design via consensus estimates, cross checking, and profit extraction
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
On the on-line k-truck problem with benefit maximization
ISAAC'06 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
Selling in Exclusive Markets: Some Observations on Prior-Free Mechanism Design
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation - Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory
Mechanism Design via Consensus Estimates, Cross Checking, and Profit Extraction
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation - Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory
Prior-free auctions for budgeted agents
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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We introduce the following consensus estimate problem. Several processors hold private and possibly different lower bounds on a value. The processors do not communicate with each other, but can observe a shared source of random numbers. The goal is to come up with a consensus lower bound on the value that is as high as possible. We give a solution to the consensus estimate problem and show how it is useful in the context of mechanism design. The consensus problem is natural and may have other applications. Based on our consensus estimate technique, we introduce Consensus Revenue Estimate (CORE) auctions. This is a class of competitive revenue-maximizing auctions that is interesting for several reasons. One auction from this class achieves a better competitive ratio than any previously known auction. Another one uses only two random bits, whereas the previously known competitive auctions on n bidders use n random bits. Furthermore, a parameterized CORE auction performs better than the previous auctions in the context of mass-market goods, such as digital goods.