SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
An Empirical Study of Collusion Behavior in the Maze P2P File-Sharing System
ICDCS '07 Proceedings of the 27th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy
FOCS '07 Proceedings of the 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
eBay in the Sky: strategy-proof wireless spectrum auctions
Proceedings of the 14th ACM international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Revenue generation for truthful spectrum auction in dynamic spectrum access
Proceedings of the tenth ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Dynamic spectrum access models: toward an engineering perspective in the spectrum debate
IEEE Communications Magazine
Multi-Stage Pricing Game for Collusion-Resistant Dynamic Spectrum Allocation
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
SMASHER: a strategy-proof combinatorial auction mechanism for heterogeneous channel redistribution
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Personal and Ubiquitous Computing
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Dynamic spectrum auction is an effective solution to provide spectrum on-demand to many small wireless networks. As the number of participants grows, bidder collusion becomes a serious threat. In this paper, we study bidder collusion in large-scale spectrum auctions, investigating its impact on auction outcomes. We found that the nature of the complex interference constraints among bidders provides a fertile breeding ground for colluders, causing significant damage in auction efficiency and revenue. In particular, collusion group of small size plays a dominant role since it is easy to form and hard to be detected. We propose Athena, a new collusion-resistant auction framework for large-scale dynamic spectrum auction. Athena implements a soft collusion resistance, allowing the auctioneer to exploit the tradeoff between the level of collusion resistance and the cost of achieving such level of resistance. Unlike existing solutions, Athena enables spectrum reuse across bidders, achieves soft collusion resistance against any form of collusive bidding strategy, maintains provable revenue guarantee, and does so with polynomial-time complexity. To provide a comprehensive evaluation, we first analytically prove Athena's collusion resistance and revenue guarantee (under any bids), and then experimentally verify our analytical conclusions using empirical bid distributions.