Competitive auctions and digital goods
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Envy-free auctions for digital goods
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Adaptive limited-supply online auctions
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Multi-unit auctions with unknown supply
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Limited and online supply and the bayesian foundations of prior-free mechanism design
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the competitive ratio of the random sampling auction
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
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We improve the best known competitive ratio (from 1/4 to 1/2), for the online multi-unit allocation problem, where the objective is to maximize the single-price revenue. Moreover, the competitive ratio of our algorithm tends to 1, as the bid-profile tends to "smoothen". This algorithm is used as a subroutine in designing truthful auctions for the same setting: the allocation has to be done online, while the payments can be decided at the end of the day. Earlier, a reduction from the auction design problem to the allocation problem was known only for the unit-demand case. We give a reduction for the general case when the bidders have decreasing marginal utilities. The problem is inspired by sponsored search auctions.