On approximating optimal auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
The Price of Truth: Frugality in Truthful Mechanisms
STACS '03 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal mechanism design and money burning
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Revenue maximization with a single sample
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the competitive ratio of online sampling auctions
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Buy-it-now or take-a-chance: a simple sequential screening mechanism
Proceedings of the 20th international conference on World wide web
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Bayesian mechanism design for budget-constrained agents
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On optimal single-item auctions
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Crowdsourced Bayesian auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference
Mechanism design via correlation gap
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Simple, optimal and efficient auctions
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Prior-independent multi-parameter mechanism design
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Prior-free auctions with ordered bidders
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Budget feasible mechanism design: from prior-free to bayesian
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Approximating optimal combinatorial auctions for complements using restricted welfare maximization
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Mixed-bundling auctions with reserve prices
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
Lower bounds on revenue of approximately optimal auctions
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Selling in Exclusive Markets: Some Observations on Prior-Free Mechanism Design
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation - Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory
Prior-independent auctions for risk-averse agents
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A dynamic axiomatic approach to first-price auctions
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the ratio of revenue to welfare in single-parameter mechanism design
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal and near-optimal mechanism design with interdependent values
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
The monopolist's theory of optimal single-item auctions for agents with independent private values can be summarized by two statements. The first is from Myerson [8]: the optimal auction is Vickrey with a reserve price. The second is from Bulow and Klemperer [1]: it is better to recruit one more bidder and run the Vickrey auction than to run the optimal auction. These results hold for single-item auctions under the assumption that the agents' valuations are independently and identically drawn from a distribution that satisfies a natural (and prevalent) regularity condition. These fundamental guarantees for the Vickrey auction fail to hold in general single-parameter agent mechanism design problems. We give precise (and weak) conditions under which approximate analogs of these two results hold, thereby demonstrating that simple mechanisms remain almost optimal in quite general single-parameter agent settings.