Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The Value of Knowing a Demand Curve: Bounds on Regret for Online Posted-Price Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Online learning in online auctions
Theoretical Computer Science - Special issue: Online algorithms in memoriam, Steve Seiden
Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Matroids, secretary problems, and online mechanisms
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Posted prices vs. negotiations: an asymptotic analysis
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Secretary problems: weights and discounts
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Online stochastic packing applied to display ad allocation
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part I
Selective call out and real time bidding
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Approximation schemes for sequential posted pricing in multi-unit auctions
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Buy-it-now or take-a-chance: a simple sequential screening mechanism
Proceedings of the 20th international conference on World wide web
Bayesian mechanism design for budget-constrained agents
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On optimal single-item auctions
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Submodular function maximization via the multilinear relaxation and contention resolution schemes
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On optimal multidimensional mechanism design
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Buyback problem: approximate matroid intersection with cancellation costs
ICALP'11 Proceedings of the 38th international colloquim conference on Automata, languages and programming - Volume Part I
Multi-parameter mechanism design under budget and matroid constraints
ESA'11 Proceedings of the 19th European conference on Algorithms
Crowdsourced Bayesian auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference
Optimal crowdsourcing contests
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Bayesian incentive compatibility via fractional assignments
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
On revenue in the generalized second price auction
Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web
Simple, optimal and efficient auctions
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Prior-independent multi-parameter mechanism design
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Budget feasible mechanism design: from prior-free to bayesian
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Dynamic pricing with limited supply
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Learning on a budget: posted price mechanisms for online procurement
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Mechanisms and allocations with positive network externalities
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Approximately optimal auctions for selling privacy when costs are correlated with data
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Mixed-bundling auctions with reserve prices
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Secretary problems with convex costs
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part I
Approximation algorithms for online weighted rank function maximization under matroid constraints
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part I
Revenue guarantees in sponsored search auctions
ESA'12 Proceedings of the 20th Annual European conference on Algorithms
Mechanism design for a risk averse seller
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
A stochastic probing problem with applications
IPCO'13 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Optimal auctions via the multiplicative weight method
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Pricing public goods for private sale
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Efficient parking allocation as online bipartite matching with posted prices
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Stochastic combinatorial optimization via poisson approximation
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We study the classic mathematical economics problem of Bayesian optimal mechanism design where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-interested agents with preferences drawn from a known distribution. In single parameter settings (i.e., where each agent's preference is given by a single private value for being served and zero for not being served) this problem is solved [20]. Unfortunately, these single parameter optimal mechanisms are impractical and rarely employed [1], and furthermore the underlying economic theory fails to generalize to the important, relevant, and unsolved multi-dimensional setting (i.e., where each agent's preference is given by multiple values for each of the multiple services available) [25]. In contrast to the theory of optimal mechanisms we develop a theory of sequential posted price mechanisms, where agents in sequence are offered take-it-or-leave-it prices. We prove that these mechanisms are approximately optimal in single-dimensional settings. These posted-price mechanisms avoid many of the properties of optimal mechanisms that make the latter impractical. Furthermore, these mechanisms generalize naturally to multi-dimensional settings where they give the first known approximations to the elusive optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem. In particular, we solve multi-dimensional multi-unit auction problems and generalizations to matroid feasibility constraints. The constant approximations we obtain range from 1.5 to 8. For all but one case, our posted price sequences can be computed in polynomial time. This work can be viewed as an extension and improvement of the single-agent algorithmic pricing work of [9] to the setting of multiple agents where the designer has combinatorial feasibility constraints on which agents can simultaneously obtain each service.