On approximating optimal auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
On the Hardness of Optimal Auctions
FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Randomized truthful auctions of digital goods are randomizations over truthful auctions
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Pricing randomized allocations
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
On optimal single-item auctions
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
GSP auctions with correlated types
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On optimal single-item auctions
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multi-parameter mechanism design under budget and matroid constraints
ESA'11 Proceedings of the 19th European conference on Algorithms
Crowdsourced Bayesian auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference
On the approximation ratio of k-lookahead auction
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Signaling schemes for revenue maximization
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Efficiency-revenue trade-offs in auctions
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
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We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there exists an algorithm that finds the optimal randomized mechanism that runs in time polynomial in the size of the support. We leverage this result to show that in the oracle model introduced by Ronen and Saberi [FOCS'02], there exists a polynomial time truthful in expectation mechanism that provides a (1.5+ε)-approximation to the revenue achievable by an optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism, and a polynomial time deterministic truthful mechanism that guarantees 5/3 approximation to the revenue achievable by an optimal deterministic truthful mechanism. We show that the 5/3-approximation mechanism provides the same approximation ratio also with respect to the optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism. This shows that the performance gap between truthful-in-expectation and deterministic mechanisms is relatively small. En route, we solve an open question of Mehta and Vazirani [EC'04]. Finally, we extend some of our results to the multi-item case, and show how to compute the optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanisms for bidders with more complex valuations.