Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Competitive auctions and digital goods
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Incentive-compatible online auctions for digital goods
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Computing equilibria for congestion games with (im)perfect information
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Randomized truthful auctions of digital goods are randomizations over truthful auctions
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Nearly optimal multi attribute auctions
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Enhancing digital advertising using dynamically configurable multimedia
ICME '03 Proceedings of the 2003 International Conference on Multimedia and Expo - Volume 2
Computing equilibria for a service provider game with (Im)perfect information
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Designing and learning optimal finite support auctions
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Stepwise randomized combinatorial auctions achieve revenue monotonicity
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
A multidimensional procurement auction for trading composite services
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
On optimal single-item auctions
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful auctions with optimal profit
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Bayesian optimal no-deficit mechanism design
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Crowdsourced Bayesian auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference
On the approximation ratio of k-lookahead auction
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Optimal and near-optimal mechanism design with interdependent values
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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We study the following problem: A seller wishes to sell an item to a group of self-interested agents. Each agent i has a privately known valuation vi for the object. Given a distribution on these valuations, our goal is to construct an auction that maximizes the seller's expected revenue (optimal auction). The auction must be incentive compatible and satisfy individual rationality. We present a simple generic auction that guarantees at least half of the optimal revenue. We generalize this result in several directions, in particular, for the case of multiple copies with unit demand. Our auction requires the ability to learn (or compute) in polynomial time the conditional distribution of the agent with the maximal valuation, given the valuations of the other agents. We show that this ability is in some sense essential. Finally we suggest a generalization of our auction and argue that it will generate a revenue which is close to optimal for reasonable distributions. In particular we show this under an independence assumption