On approximating optimal auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
On the Hardness of Optimal Auctions
FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
An English Auction Protocol for Multi-attribute Items
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
Auction based interface selection in heterogeneous wireless networks
WD'09 Proceedings of the 2nd IFIP conference on Wireless days
A multidimensional procurement auction for trading composite services
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Auctions by price and distance via cellular phones
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Fuzzy-based handover decision with multi-attribute auctions in heterogeneous network environments
International Journal of Wireless and Mobile Computing
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In almost every procurement situation, non-price attributes of the items to be purchased play a crucial role. Procurement protocols which take these attributes into account are called multi-attribute auctions.We study the following problem called optimal multi-attribute auction design: A buyer wants to procure an item which can be supplied in many possible configurations. The buyer has a value v(x) for each possible configuration x. Every seller i has a privately known cost ci(x) of supplying each possible configuration. Given a probability distribution on the cost functions, our goal is to design an auction which maximizes the expected utility of the buyer.This paper offers a generic method for the construction of nearly optimal multi-attribute auctions. The computational time of our mechanisms equals the time required for computing (or approximating) the optimal mechanism on a small number of agents. Our method can be successfully applied to many variants of multi-attribute auction design.