Business components: a case study of bankers trust Australia limited
Communications of the ACM
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On approximating optimal auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Vickrey Prices and Shortest Paths: What is an Edge Worth?
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Architectural styles and the design of network-based software architectures
Architectural styles and the design of network-based software architectures
IT Outsourcing Strategies: Universalistic, Contingency, and Configurational Explanations of Success
Information Systems Research
COTS Component Acquisition in an Emerging Market
IEEE Software
Hidden-action in multi-hop routing
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Nearly optimal multi attribute auctions
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Bid expressiveness and clearing algorithms in multiattribute double auctions
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Incentive-compatible interdomain routing
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions
Management Science
Internet of Services SAP Research Vision
WETICE '07 Proceedings of the 16th IEEE International Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises
CEC '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Achieving budget-balance with Vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
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Recently, static value chains have gradually been giving way to highly agile service value networks. This involves novel economic and organizational challenges. Added value for customers is created by feasible compositions of distributed service components. This work focuses on the design of a multidimensional procurement auction for trading service compositions and the analysis of strategies for service providers that participate in the procurement process. The mechanism implementation is incentive-compatible, so that it results in an equilibrium in which revealing the true multidimensional type (quality of service and valuation) is a weakly-dominant strategy for all service providers. Due to combinatorial restrictions imposed by the underlying graph topology, the winner determination problem can be solved in polynomial time, in contrast to computationally-intractable combinatorial auctions which cannot be solved this way. Furthermore, we provide a simulation-based analysis based on a reinforcement learning model of bundling and unbundling strategies of service providers that participate in the auction. Based on our results we discuss strategic recommendations for service providers depending on how they are situated within the network.