Negotiation and cooperation in multi-agent environments
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Efficient mechanisms for the supply of services in multi-agent environments
Decision Support Systems - Special issue on information and computational economics
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Bidder-Determined Combinations
Management Science
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Bid expressiveness and clearing algorithms in multiattribute double auctions
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Software frameworks for advanced procurement auction markets
Communications of the ACM - Software product line
Generalized value decomposition and structured multiattribute auctions
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Buyer's Efficient E-Sourcing Structure: Centralize or Decentralize?
Journal of Management Information Systems
HoloMAS '07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Industrial Applications of Holonic and Multi-Agent Systems: Holonic and Multi-Agent Systems for Manufacturing
A framework for QoS-based Web service contracting
ACM Transactions on the Web (TWEB)
The Complementary Effects of E-Markets on Existing Supplier-Buyer Relationships in a Supply Chain
Journal of Management Information Systems
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mechanism design with partial revelation
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Information revelation in multiattribute English auctions: A laboratory study
Decision Support Systems
A multidimensional procurement auction for trading composite services
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Multiattribute auctions based on generalized additive independence
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Preference-based English reverse auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
A Laboratory Investigation of Rank Feedback in Procurement Auctions
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
QoS-Based task scheduling in crowdsourcing environments
ICSOC'11 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Service-Oriented Computing
Procuring Commodities: First-Price Sealed-Bid or English Auctions?
Marketing Science
Procurement decision making mechanism of divisible goods based on multi-attribute auction
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Computers and Industrial Engineering
Multi criteria operators for multi-attribute auctions
MDAI'12 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Modeling Decisions for Artificial Intelligence
Journal of Management Information Systems
Service customization under capacity constraints: an auction-based model
Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing
Hi-index | 0.01 |
Multiattribute auctions extend traditional auction settings to allow negotiation over nonprice attributes such as weight, color, and terms of delivery, in addition to price and promise to improve market efficiency in markets with configurable goods. This paper provides an iterative auction design for an important special case of the multiattribute allocation problem with special (preferential independent) additive structure on the buyer value and seller costs. Auction Additive&Discrete provides a refined design for a price-based auction in which the price feedback decomposes to an additive part with a price for each attribute and an aggregate part that appears as a price discount for each supplier. In addition, this design also has excellent information revelation properties that are validated through computational experiments. The auction terminates with an outcome of a modified Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. This paper also develops Auction NonLinear&Discrete for the more general nonlinear case-a particularly simple design that solves the general multiattribute allocation problem, but requires that the auctioneer maintains prices on bundles of attribute levels.