Auctions with Arbitrary Deals

Authors:
Tamás Máhr;Mathijs Weerdt
Affiliations:
Almende BV, Westerstraat 50, 3016DJ Rotterdam, The Netherlands and Delft University of Technology, Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer, Science, PO Box 5031, 2600GA Delft, The Netherl ...;Delft University of Technology, Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer, Science, PO Box 5031, 2600GA Delft, The Netherlands
Venue:
HoloMAS '07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Industrial Applications of Holonic and Multi-Agent Systems: Holonic and Multi-Agent Systems for Manufacturing
Year:
2007

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Abstract

To come to a deal, a bargaining process can sometimes take a long time. An auction may be a faster, but existing auction models cannot cope with situations where money is not an issue, or where it is difficult to express the utility of all participants in a monetary domain.We propose a modified Vickrey auction based only on preferences over the possible bids. This approach also allows for situations where a bid is not just a price or some fixed set of attributes, but can be any possible offer. We prove that in this flexible, generalized setting, the Vickrey mechanism is still incentive compatible and results in a Pareto-efficient solution.