Forming coalitions in the face of uncertain rewards
AAAI '94 Proceedings of the twelfth national conference on Artificial intelligence (vol. 1)
On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Coalition, cryptography, and stability: mechanisms for coalition formation in task oriented domains
AAAI '94 Proceedings of the twelfth national conference on Artificial intelligence (vol. 1)
Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
On the complexity of testing membership in the core of min-cost spanning tree games
International Journal of Game Theory
Combinatorial optimization games
SODA '97 Proceedings of the eighth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
Artificial Intelligence
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On the core of the multicommodity flow game
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Cooperative facility location games
Journal of Algorithms - Special issue: SODA 2000
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation
Artificial Intelligence
A kernel-oriented model for coalition-formation in general environments: implementation and results
AAAI'96 Proceedings of the thirteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
SOFSEM '07 Proceedings of the 33rd conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science
HoloMAS '07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Industrial Applications of Holonic and Multi-Agent Systems: Holonic and Multi-Agent Systems for Manufacturing
Agent long-term coalition credit
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
Solving coalitional resource games
Artificial Intelligence
Local Search Algorithms for Core Checking in Hedonic Coalition Games
ICCCI '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Computational Collective Intelligence. Semantic Web, Social Networks and Multiagent Systems
The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
On the computational complexity of weighted voting games
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
An anytime coalition restructuring algorithm in an open environment
ICIC'07 Proceedings of the intelligent computing 3rd international conference on Advanced intelligent computing theories and applications
Coalition structure generation utilizing compact characteristic function representations
CP'09 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Principles and practice of constraint programming
On agent types in coalition formation problems
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Stochastic local search for core membership checking in hedonic games
Transactions on computational collective intelligence I
Core non-emptiness checking in hedonic games via difference logic
KES-AMSTA'10 Proceedings of the 4th KES international conference on Agent and multi-agent systems: technologies and applications, Part I
Cooperative games with overlapping coalitions
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
On the complexity of core, kernel, and bargaining set
Artificial Intelligence
Complexity of coalition structure generation
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
A truth serum for sharing rewards
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Extension of MC-net-based coalition structure generation: handling negative rules and externalities
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Concise characteristic function representations in coalitional games based on agent types
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
An algorithm for generating nash stable coalition structures in hedonic games
FoIKS'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Foundations of Information and Knowledge Systems
PRIMA'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Agents in Principle, Agents in Practice
On the complexity of the core over coalition structures
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Subsidies, stability, and restricted cooperation in coalitional games
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Concise characteristic function representations in coalitional games based on agent types
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Handling negative value rules in MC-net-based coalition structure generation
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Sharing Rewards Among Strangers Based on Peer Evaluations
Decision Analysis
Coalition structure generation over graphs
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A heuristic approximation method for the Banzhaf index for voting games
Multiagent and Grid Systems
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Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can accomplish them more efficiently. Motivating the agents to abide by a solution requires careful analysis: only some of the solutions are stable in the sense that no group of agents is motivated to break off and form a new coalition. This constraint has been studied extensively in cooperative game theory: the set of solutions that satisfy it is known as the core. The computational questions around the core have received less attention. When it comes to coalition formation among software agents (that represent real-world parties), these questions become increasingly explicit. In this paper we define a concise, natural, general representation for games in characteristic form that relies on superadditivity. In our representation, individual agents' values are given as well as values for those coalitions that introduce synergies. We show that this representation allows for efficient checking of whether a given outcome is in the core. We then show that determining whether the core is nonempty is NP-complete both with and without transferable utility. We demonstrate that what makes the problem hard in both cases is determining the collaborative possibilities (the set of outcomes possible for the grand coalition); we do so by showing that if these are given, the problem becomes solvable in time polynomial in the size of the representation in both cases. However, we then demonstrate that for a hybrid version of the problem, where utility transfer is possible only within the grand coalition, the problem remains NP-complete even when the collaborative possibilities are given. Finally, we show that for convex characteristic functions, a solution in the core can be computed efficiently (in O(nl^2) time, where n is the number of agents and l is the number of synergies), even when the collaborative possibilities are not given in advance.