An algorithm for generating nash stable coalition structures in hedonic games

Authors:
Helena Keinänen
Affiliations:
Faculty of Information and Natural Sciences, Helsinki University of Technology
Venue:
FoIKS'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Foundations of Information and Knowledge Systems
Year:
2010

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Abstract

In this paper, we consider a problem of generating Nash stable solutions in coalitional games. In particular, we present an algorithm for constructing the set of all Nash stable coalition structures from players' preferences in a given additively separable hedonic game. We show the correctness and completeness of the algorithm. Our experiments with several classes of hedonic games demonstrate the usefulness and practical efficiency of the algorithm.