The complexity of Boolean networks
The complexity of Boolean networks
Stability in coalition formation games
International Journal of Game Theory
Treewidth: Algorithmoc Techniques and Results
MFCS '97 Proceedings of the 22nd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Stable partitions with W-preferences
Discrete Applied Mathematics
Marginal contribution nets: a compact representation scheme for coalitional games
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Infeasibility certificates and the complexity of the core in coalitional games
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games
Operations Research Letters
Local Search Algorithms for Core Checking in Hedonic Coalition Games
ICCCI '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Computational Collective Intelligence. Semantic Web, Social Networks and Multiagent Systems
Stochastic local search for core membership checking in hedonic games
Transactions on computational collective intelligence I
Core non-emptiness checking in hedonic games via difference logic
KES-AMSTA'10 Proceedings of the 4th KES international conference on Agent and multi-agent systems: technologies and applications, Part I
Computing stable outcomes in hedonic games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Stable partitions in additively separable hedonic games
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Computing stable outcomes in hedonic games with voting-based deviations
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
An algorithm for generating nash stable coalition structures in hedonic games
FoIKS'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Foundations of Information and Knowledge Systems
Computing desirable partitions in additively separable hedonic games
Artificial Intelligence
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
In hedonic games, players have the opportunity to form coalitions, and have preferences over the coalitions they might join. Such games can be used to model a variety of settings ranging from multi-agent coordination to group formation in social networks. However, the practical application of hedonic games is hindered by the fact that the naive representation for such games is exponential in the number of players. In this paper, we study hedonic coalition nets---a succinct, rule-based representation for hedonic games. This formalism is based on marginal contribution nets, which were developed by Ieong and Shoham for representing coalitional games with transferable utility. We show that hedonic coalition nets are universally expressive, yet are at least as succinct as other existing representation schemes for hedonic games. We then investigate the complexity of many natural decision problems for hedonic coalition nets. In particular, we provide a complete characterisation of the computational difficulty of problems related to coalitional stability for hedonic games represented with hedonic nets.