On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
Artificial Intelligence
On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Machine Learning
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Nash Stability in Additively Separable Hedonic Games and Community Structures
Theory of Computing Systems - Special Issue: Computation and Logic in the Real World; Guest Editors: S. Barry Cooper, Elvira Mayordomo and Andrea Sorbi
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
An anytime algorithm for optimal coalition structure generation
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
Computing stable outcomes in hedonic games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Computing stable outcomes in hedonic games with voting-based deviations
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Pareto optimality in coalition formation
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Pareto optimality in house allocation problems
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
Popular matchings in the marriage and roommates problems
CIAC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Algorithms and Complexity
On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games
Operations Research Letters
A polynomial-time approximation scheme for maximizing the minimum machine completion time
Operations Research Letters
Two hardness results for core stability in hedonic coalition formation games
Discrete Applied Mathematics
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An important aspect in systems of multiple autonomous agents is the exploitation of synergies via coalition formation. Additively separable hedonic games are a fundamental class of coalition formation games in which each player has a value for any other player and the value of a coalition to a particular player is simply the sum of the values he assigns to the members of his coalition. In this paper, we consider a number of solution concepts from cooperative game theory, welfare theory, and social choice theory as criteria for desirable partitions in hedonic games. We then conduct a detailed computational analysis of computing, checking the existence of, and verifying stable, fair, optimal, and popular partitions for additively separable hedonic games.