On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Algorithmic Game Theory
Stable partitions in additively separable hedonic games
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Peer effects and stability in matching markets
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Optimal partitions in additively separable hedonic games
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Computing desirable partitions in additively separable hedonic games
Artificial Intelligence
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We present and analyze coalitional affinity games, a family of hedonic games that explicitly model the value that an agent receives from being associated with other agents. We provide a characterization of the social-welfare maximizing coalition structures, and study the stability properties of affinity games, using the core solution concept. Interestingly, we observe that members of the core do not necessarily maximize social welfare. We introduce a new measure, the stability-gap to capture this difference. Using the stability gap, we show that for an interesting class of coalitional affinity games, the difference between the social welfare of a stable coalition structure and a social-welfare maximizing coalition structure is bounded by a factor of 2, and that this bound is tight.