On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
Artificial Intelligence
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computational Complexity: A Modern Approach
Computational Complexity: A Modern Approach
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Nash Stability in Additively Separable Hedonic Games and Community Structures
Theory of Computing Systems - Special Issue: Computation and Logic in the Real World; Guest Editors: S. Barry Cooper, Elvira Mayordomo and Andrea Sorbi
Computing stable outcomes in hedonic games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games
Operations Research Letters
Computing stable outcomes in hedonic games with voting-based deviations
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
WI-IAT '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
On non-trivial Nash stable partitions in additive hedonic games with symmetric 0/1-utilities
Information Processing Letters
Stable marriage and roommate problems with individual-based stability
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Matchings with externalities and attitudes
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Fostering Cooperation through Dynamic Coalition Formation and Partner Switching
ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems (TAAS)
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An important aspect in systems of multiple autonomous agents is the exploitation of synergies via coalition formation. In this paper, we solve various open problems concerning the computational complexity of stable partitions in additively separable hedonic games. First, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a contractually individually stable partition. This contrasts with previous results such as the NP-hardness of computing individually stable or Nash stable partitions. Secondly, we prove that checking whether the core or the strict core exists is NP-hard in the strong sense even if the preferences of the players are symmetric. Finally, it is shown that verifying whether a partition consisting of the grand coalition is contractual strict core stable or Pareto optimal is coNP-complete.