The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
NP-complete stable matching problems
Journal of Algorithms
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics
Stable marriage and indifference
CO89 Selected papers of the conference on Combinatorial Optimization
Hard variants of stable marriage
Theoretical Computer Science
Stability in coalition formation games
International Journal of Game Theory
Social and Economic Networks
Nash Stability in Additively Separable Hedonic Games and Community Structures
Theory of Computing Systems - Special Issue: Computation and Logic in the Real World; Guest Editors: S. Barry Cooper, Elvira Mayordomo and Andrea Sorbi
Complexity and stochastic evolution of dyadic networks
Computers and Operations Research
Computing stable outcomes in hedonic games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Stable partitions in additively separable hedonic games
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Computing stable outcomes in hedonic games with voting-based deviations
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Uncoordinated Two-Sided Matching Markets
SIAM Journal on Computing
Individual-based stability in hedonic games depending on the best or worst players
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
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Research regarding the stable marriage and roommate problem has a long and distinguished history in mathematics, computer science and economics. Stability in this context is predominantly core stability or one of its variants in which each deviation is by a group of players. We consider stability concepts such as Nash stability and individual stability in which the deviation is by a single player. Such stability concepts are suitable especially when trust for the other party is limited, complex coordination is not feasible, or when only unmatched agents can be approached. Furthermore, weaker stability notions such as individual stability may in principle circumvent the negative existence and computational complexity results in matching theory. We characterize the computational complexity of checking the existence and computing individual-based stable matchings for the marriage and roommate settings. Some of our key computational results also carry over to different classes of hedonic games and network formation games for which individual-based stability has already been of much interest.