On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
Artificial Intelligence
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Machine Learning
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
Pareto optimality in house allocation problems
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
A polynomial-time approximation scheme for maximizing the minimum machine completion time
Operations Research Letters
Existence of stability in hedonic coalition formation games
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
On non-trivial Nash stable partitions in additive hedonic games with symmetric 0/1-utilities
Information Processing Letters
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We conduct a computational analysis of fair and optimal partitions in additively separable hedonic games. We show that, for strict preferences, a Pareto optimal partition can be found in polynomial time while verifying whether a given partition is Pareto optimal is coNP-complete, even when preferences are symmetric and strict. Moreover, computing a partition with maximum egalitarian or utilitarian social welfare or one which is both Pareto optimal and individually rational is NP-hard. We also prove that checking whether there exists a partition which is both Pareto optimal and envy-free is Σ2p-complete. Even though an envy-free partition and a Nash stable partition are both guaranteed to exist for symmetric preferences, checking whether there exists a partition which is both envy-free and Nash stable is NP-complete.