Stability in coalition formation games
International Journal of Game Theory
Computing stable outcomes in hedonic games with voting-based deviations
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Pareto optimality in coalition formation
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Optimal partitions in additively separable hedonic games
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
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In this paper, we examine hedonic coalition formation games in which each player's preferences over partitions of players depend only on the members of his coalition. We present three main results in which restrictions on the preferences of the players guarantee the existence of stable partitions for various notions of stability. The preference restrictions pertain to top responsiveness and bottom responsiveness which model optimistic and pessimistic behavior of players respectively. The existence results apply to natural subclasses of additively separable hedonic games and hedonic games with B-preferences. It is also shown that our existence results cannot be strengthened to the case of stronger known stability concepts.