Stable partitions with W-preferences
Discrete Applied Mathematics
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Infeasibility certificates and the complexity of the core in coalitional games
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
Artificial Intelligence
A fast linear-arithmetic solver for DPLL(T)
CAV'06 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
DPLL(T) with exhaustive theory propagation and its application to difference logic
CAV'05 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
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Hedonic games provide a useful formalism to model cooperation of self-interested agents. This is due to the fact that all stable partitionings of a set of agents into disjoint coalitions can be represented as a core of a hedonic game. An important problem in this setting is to decide whether or not a given hedonic game allows for a stable partitioning of the players into disjoint coalitions. This amounts to checking whether a core of a hedonic game is non-empty which is known to be an NP-complete problem. In this paper, a novel method to check the core non-emptiness in hedonic games is presented. A compact characterisation of hedonic game core non-emptiness is given in difference logic. This characterisation leads to employment of difference logic satisfiability testing algorithms to check core non-emptiness in hedonic games. An implementation of the method is reported together with experimental results to demonstrate the usefulness and applicability of the presented approach.