On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Marginal contribution nets: a compact representation scheme for coalitional games
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Coalition Structures in Weighted Voting Games
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Infeasibility certificates and the complexity of the core in coalitional games
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
Artificial Intelligence
On the complexity of compact coalitional games
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
On the computational complexity of weighted voting games
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Minimal subsidies in expense sharing games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
On the complexity of core, kernel, and bargaining set
Artificial Intelligence
Coalitional stability in structured environments
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Sharing rewards in cooperative connectivity games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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The computational complexity of relevant core-related questions for coalitional games is addressed from the coalition structure viewpoint, i.e., without assuming that the grand-coalition necessarily forms. In the analysis, games are assumed to be in "compact" form, i.e., their worth functions are implicitly given as polynomial-time computable functions over succinct game encodings provided as input. Within this setting, a complete picture of the complexity issues arising with the core, as well as with the related stability concepts of least core and cost of stability, is depicted. In particular, the special cases of superadditive games and of games whose sets of feasible coalitions are restricted over tree-like interaction graphs are also studied.