Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Anytime coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
AAAI '98/IAAI '98 Proceedings of the fifteenth national/tenth conference on Artificial intelligence/Innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Computers and Intractability; A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability; A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Bayesian Reinforcement Learning for Coalition Formation under Uncertainty
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Computational complexity of weighted threshold games
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Anytime optimal coalition structure generation
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
The price of democracy in coalition formation
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Simple coalitional games with beliefs
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Local Search Algorithms for Core Checking in Hedonic Coalition Games
ICCCI '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Computational Collective Intelligence. Semantic Web, Social Networks and Multiagent Systems
The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
On the computational complexity of weighted voting games
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
On the stability of an Optimal Coalition Structure
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Stochastic local search for core membership checking in hedonic games
Transactions on computational collective intelligence I
Cooperative games with overlapping coalitions
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
False-name manipulations in weighted voting games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Using personality to create alliances in group recommender systems
ICCBR'11 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Case-Based Reasoning Research and Development
On the complexity of the core over coalition structures
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Coalitional stability in structured environments
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Pareto Optimal Allocation in Multi-agent Coalitional Games with Non-linear Payoffs
ASONAM '12 Proceedings of the 2012 International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining (ASONAM 2012)
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Weighted voting games are a popular model of collaboration in multiagent systems. In such games, each agent has a weight (intuitively corresponding to resources he can contribute), and a coalition of agents wins if its total weight meets or exceeds a given threshold. Even though coalitional stability in such games is important, existing research has nonetheless only considered the stability of the grand coalition. In this paper, we introduce a model for weighted voting games with coalition structures. This is a natural extension in the context of multiagent systems, as several groups of agents may be simultaneously at work, each serving a different task. We then proceed to study stability in this context. First, we define the CS-core, a notion of the core for such settings, discuss its non-emptiness, and relate it to the traditional notion of the core in weighted voting games. We then investigate its computational properties. We show that, in contrast with the traditional setting, it is computationally hard to decide whether a game has a non-empty CS-core, or whether a given outcome is in the CS-core. However, we then provide an efficient algorithm that verifies whether an outcome is in the CS-core if all weights are small (polynomially bounded). Finally, we also suggest heuristic algorithms for checking the non-emptiness of the CS-core.