On complexity as bounded rationality (extended abstract)
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
NP-completeness for calculating power indices of weighted majority games
Theoretical Computer Science
A heuristic technique for multi-agent planning
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
A randomized method for the shapley value for the voting game
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
False-name bids in combinatorial auctions
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
An anytime approximation method for the inverse Shapley value problem
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Divide and conquer: false-name manipulations in weighted voting games
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Note: The complexity of power-index comparison
Theoretical Computer Science
Computing the nucleolus of weighted voting games
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Boolean combinations of weighted voting games
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
False name manipulations in weighted voting games: splitting, merging and annexation
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Coalition Structures in Weighted Voting Games
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
A compact representation scheme for coalitional games in open anonymous environments
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Coalitional games in open anonymous environments
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Computational complexity of weighted threshold games
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
On the dimensionality of voting games
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Approximating power indices: theoretical and empirical analysis
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
False-name-proof mechanisms for hiring a team
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Enumeration and exact design of weighted voting games
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games
Artificial Intelligence
The Shapley value as a function of the quota in weighted voting games
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Proof systems and transformation games
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Mergers and collusion in all-pay auctions and crowdsourcing contests
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Sharing rewards in cooperative connectivity games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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Weighted voting is a classic model of cooperation among agents in decision-making domains. In such games, each player has a weight, and a coalition of players wins the game if its total weight meets or exceeds a given quota. A player's power in such games is usually not directly proportional to his weight, and is measured by a power index, the most prominent among which are the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index. In this paper, we investigate by how much a player can change his power, as measured by the Shapley-Shubik index or the Banzhaf index, by means of a false-name manipulation, i.e., splitting his weight among two or more identities. For both indices, we provide upper and lower bounds on the effect of weight-splitting. We then show that checking whether a beneficial split exists is NP-hard, and discuss efficient algorithms for restricted cases of this problem, as well as randomized algorithms for the general case. We also provide an experimental evaluation of these algorithms. Finally, we examine related forms of manipulative behavior, such as annexation, where a player subsumes other players, or merging, where several players unite into one. We characterize the computational complexity of such manipulations and provide limits on their effects. For the Banzhaf index, we describe a new paradox, which we term the Annexation Non-monotonicity Paradox.