Social choice theory and distributed decision making
COCS '88 Proceedings of the ACM SIGOIS and IEEECS TC-OA 1988 conference on Office information systems
NP-completeness of some problems concerning voting games
International Journal of Game Theory
On complexity as bounded rationality (extended abstract)
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
False-name bids in combinatorial auctions
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
An anytime approximation method for the inverse Shapley value problem
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Divide and conquer: false-name manipulations in weighted voting games
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Power and stability in connectivity games
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
A compact representation scheme for coalitional games in open anonymous environments
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Coalitional games in open anonymous environments
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Computational complexity of weighted threshold games
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
On the dimensionality of voting games
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
False-name-proof mechanisms for hiring a team
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Honor among thieves: collusion in multi-unit auctions
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on STAIRS 2010: Proceedings of the Fifth Starting AI Researchers' Symposium
A cooperative approach to collusion in auctions
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
False-name manipulations in weighted voting games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Bribery in path-disruption games
ADT'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Algorithmic decision theory
Proof systems and transformation games
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Computing cooperative solution concepts in coalitional skill games
Artificial Intelligence
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An important aspect of mechanism design in social choice protocols and multiagent systems is to discourage insincere and manipulative behaviour. We examine the computational complexity of false-name manipulation in weighted voting games which are an important class of coalitional voting games. Weighted voting games have received increased interest in the multiagent community due to their compact representation and ability to model coalitional formation scenarios. Bachrach and Elkind in their AAMAS 2008 paper examined divide and conquer false-name manipulation in weighted voting games from the point of view of Shapley-Shubik index. We analyse the corresponding case of the Banzhaf index and check how much the Banzhaf index of a player increases or decreases if it splits up into sub-players. A pseudo-polynomial algorithm to find the optimal split is also provided. Bachrach and Elkind also mentioned manipulation via merging as an open problem. In the paper, we examine the cases where a player annexes other players or merges with them to increase their Banzhaf index or Shapley-Shubik index payoff. We characterize the computational complexity of such manipulations and provide limits to the manipulation. The annexation non-monotonicity paradox is also discovered in the case of the Banzhaf index. The results give insight into coalition formation and manipulation.