Bidding clubs: institutionalized collusion in auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Bidding clubs in first-price auctions
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Algorithmic Game Theory
Divide and conquer: false-name manipulations in weighted voting games
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
False name manipulations in weighted voting games: splitting, merging and annexation
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Coalitional games in open anonymous environments
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Honor among thieves: collusion in multi-unit auctions
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Collusion in VCG path procurement auctions
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Mergers and collusion in all-pay auctions and crowdsourcing contests
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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The elegant Vickrey Clarke Groves (VCG) mechanism is well-known for the strong properties it offers: dominant truth-revealing strategies, efficiency and weak budget-balance in quite general settings. Despite this, it suffers from several drawbacks, prominently susceptibility to collusion. By jointly setting their bids, colluders may increase their utility by achieving lower prices for their items. The colluders can use monetary transfers to share this utility, but they must reach an agreement regarding their actions. We analyze the agreements that are likely to arise through a cooperative game theoretic approach, transforming the auction setting into a cooperative game. We examine both the setting of a multi-unit auction as well as path procurement auctions.