On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
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Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
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Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
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Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
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Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
False name manipulations in weighted voting games: splitting, merging and annexation
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Collusion in VCG path procurement auctions
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WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
A cooperative approach to collusion in auctions
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
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Proof systems and transformation games
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Mergers and collusion in all-pay auctions and crowdsourcing contests
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Sharing rewards in cooperative connectivity games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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We consider collusion in multi-unit auctions where the allocation and payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show how collusion can increase the utility of the colluders, characterize the optimal collusion and show it can easily be computed in polynomial time. We then analyze the colluders' coalition from a cooperative game theoretic perspective. We show that the collusion game is a convex game, so it always has a non-empty core, which contains the Shapley value. We show how to find core imputations and compute the Shapley value, and thus show that in this setting the colluders can always share the gain from their manipulation in a stable and fair way. This shows that this domain is extremely vulnerable to collusion.