Economic principles of multi-agent systems
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Artificial Intelligence
Bidding clubs: institutionalized collusion in auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Electronic Commerce: From Economic and Game-Theoretic Models to Working Protocols
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
The First International Trading Agent Competition: Autonomous Bidding Agents
Electronic Commerce Research
CABOB: a fast optimal algorithm for combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
On cheating in sealed-bid auctions
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A false-name-proof double auction protocol for arbitrary evaluation values
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Mechanisms for coalition formation and cost sharing in an electronic marketplace
ICEC '03 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Electronic commerce
On cheating in sealed-bid auctions
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On cheating in sealed-bid auctions
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Algorithms and theory of computation handbook
Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Collusion in VCG path procurement auctions
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
A cooperative approach to collusion in auctions
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
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We introduce a class of mechanisms, called bidding clubs, that allow agents to coordinate their bidding in auctions. Bidding clubs invite a set of agents to join, and each invited agent freely chooses whether to accept the invitation or whether to participate independently in the auction. Clubs first conduct a "pre-auction"; depending on the outcome of the pre-auction some subset of the members of the club bid in the primary auction in a prescribed way. We model this setting as a Bayesian game, including agents' choices of whether or not to accept a bidding club's invitation. We examine the specific case of bidding clubs for first-price auctions, showing the existence of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium where agents choose to participate in bidding clubs when invited and truthfully declare their valuations to the coordinator. Furthermore, we show that the existence of bidding clubs benefits all agents, including those who do not belong to a bidding club.