Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids.
Artificial Intelligence
Bidding clubs in first-price auctions
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
On cheating in sealed-bid auctions
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Building trust in online auction markets through an economic incentive mechanism
Decision Support Systems
The design and implementation of a secure auction service
SP '95 Proceedings of the 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Competitive safety analysis: robust decision-making in multi-agent systems
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Mechanism design with execution uncertainty
UAI'02 Proceedings of the Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Autonomous Adaptive Agents for Single Seller Sealed Bid Auctions
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
An integrated model exploring sellers' strategies in eBay auctions
Electronic Commerce Research
On the Existence of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auction Protocols
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Decision Support Systems
Detection of anomalous bids in procurement auctions
Decision Support Systems
Task-technology fit and user acceptance of online auction
International Journal of Human-Computer Studies
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Motivated by the rise of online auctions and their relative lack of security, this paper analyzes two forms of cheating in sealedbid auctions. The first type of cheating we consider occurs when the seller examines the bids of a second-price auction before the auction clears and then submits a shill bid in order to increase the payment of the winning bidder. In the second type, a bidder cheats in a first-price auction by examining the competing bids before submitting his own bid. In both cases, we derive equilibrium strategies when bidders are aware of the possibility of cheating. These results provide insights into sealed-bid auctions even in the absence of cheating, including some counterintuitive results on the effects of overbidding in a first-price auction.