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Secret sharing homomorphisms: keeping shares of a secret secret
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
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STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A zero-one law for Boolean privacy
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The Design and Implementation of a Secure Auction Service
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FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
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FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
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PKC '00 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
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PKC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems: Public Key Cryptography
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STOC '79 Proceedings of the eleventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On cheating in sealed-bid auctions
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Improving privacy in Vickrey auctions
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
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WOEC'98 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 3
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FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
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FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
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ICISC'02 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information security and cryptology
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FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
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International Journal of Human-Computer Studies
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ICICS'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security
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POST'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
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ACM Transactions on Computation Theory (TOCT)
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We investigate whether it is possible to preserve privacy in sealed-bid auctions to a maximal extent. In particular, this paper focuses on unconditional full privacy, i.e., privacy that relies neither on trusted third parties (like auctioneers), nor on computational intractability assumptions (like the hardness of factoring). These constraints imply a scenario in which bidders exchange messages according to some predefined protocol in order to jointly determine the auction outcome without revealing any additional information. It turns out that the first-price sealed-bid auction can be emulated by an unconditionally fully private protocol. However, the protocol's round complexity is exponential in the bid size, and there is no more efficient protocol. On the other hand, we prove the impossibility of privately emulating the second-price sealed-bid auction for more than two bidders. This impossibility holds even when relaxing various privacy constraints such as allowing the revelation of all but one losing bid (while maintaining anonymity) or allowing the revelation of the second highest bidder's identity.