The Michigan Internet AuctionBot: a configurable auction server for human and software agents
AGENTS '98 Proceedings of the second international conference on Autonomous agents
Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
Distributed rational decision making
Multiagent systems
Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
AkBA: a progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Economic mechanism design for computerized agents
WOEC'95 Proceedings of the 1st conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 1
Secure Vickrey auctions without threshold trust
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
Implementing private Vickrey auctions
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM symposium on Applied computing
On the Existence of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auction Protocols
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Designing a secure e-tender submission protocol
Electronic Commerce Research
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Many different types of auctions can be applied to determine selling prices, each of them fulfilling different properties. Among them, Vickrey auctions are specially interesting due to the fact that they disallow strategic behaviors of the bidders. In fact, the dominant strategy for each bidder consists in bidding his reserve price. However, somebody has to collect all the bids, so that bids are not kept private. In this paper we present a method to overcome this problem. That is, we present a way to implement Vickrey auctions preserving the privacy of all the bidders.