Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Improving privacy in Vickrey auctions
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Secure Vickrey auctions without threshold trust
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
Designing a secure e-tender submission protocol
Electronic Commerce Research
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Vickrey auctions have the interesting property of eliminating any incentive for bidders to bid values that are different from their reserve prices (i.e., the true value they give to the item being auctioned). For several reasons, it is desirable that bidders keep private their reserve price. In [2] a protocol to implement a Vickrey auction was presented. Its main feature is that bids are kept private without the necessity of any trusted third party. In particular, after the auction is finished only the value of the second highest bid and the identity of the highest bidder are publicly revealed. However, in that paper several questions about the applicability of the protocol were left unanswered. In particular, all the presentation was theoretical and no implementation was provided. Besides, the analysis of collusion risk was too brief. In this paper we address these issues in a deeper way. In addition, we present and analyze an implementation of the protocol, and we consider its practical applicability.