On the Existence of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auction Protocols
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Unconditionally secure first-price auction protocols using a multicomponent commitment scheme
ICICS'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security
Bidder-anonymous English auction protocol based on revocable ring signature
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
Secure computation with fixed-point numbers
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Formal verification of e-auction protocols
POST'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Defining verifiability in e-auction protocols
Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGSAC symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Verifiable auctions for online ad exchanges
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2013 conference on SIGCOMM
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Privacy has become a factor of increasing importance in auction design. We propose general techniques for cryptographic first-price and (M+1)st-price auction protocols that only yield the winners' identities and the selling price. Moreover, if desired, losing bidders learn no information at all, except that they lost. Our security model is merely based on computational intractability. In particular, our approach does not rely on trusted third parties, e.g., auctioneers. We present an efficient implementation of the proposed techniques based on El Gamal encryption whose security only relies on the intractability of the decisional Diffie—Hellman problem. The resulting protocols require just three rounds of bidder broadcasting in the random oracle model. Communication complexity is linear in the number of possible bids.