Mechanism design with execution uncertainty

Authors:
Ryan Porter;Amir Ronen;Yoav Shoham;Moshe Tennenholtz
Affiliations:
Computer Science Department, Stanford University;Computer Science Department, Stanford University and ICSI, UC Berkeley;Computer Science Department, Stanford University;Computer Science Department, Stanford University
Venue:
UAI'02 Proceedings of the Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Year:
2002

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Abstract

We introduce the notion of fault tolerant mechanism design, which extends the standard game theoretic framework of mechanism design to allow for uncertainty about execution. Specifically, we define the problem of task allocation in which the private information of the agents is not only their costs to attempt the tasks, but also their probabilities of failure. For several different instances of this setting we present technical results, including positive ones in the form of mechanisms that are incentive compatible, individually rational and efficient, and negative ones in the form of impossibility theorems.