AAAI '98/IAAI '98 Proceedings of the fifteenth national/tenth conference on Artificial intelligence/Innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Combinatorial auctions for supply chain formation
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Algorithms for Optimizing Leveled Commitment Contracts
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
On the Sensitivity of Incremental Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions
WECWIS '02 Proceedings of the Fourth IEEE International Workshop on Advanced Issues of E-Commerce and Web-Based Information Systems (WECWIS'02)
Constraint Processing
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Management Science
Mechanism design with execution uncertainty
UAI'02 Proceedings of the Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Weighted super solutions for constraint programs
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Truthful risk-managed combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
A declarative approach to robust weighted Max-SAT
Proceedings of the 12th international ACM SIGPLAN symposium on Principles and practice of declarative programming
Balancing Optimality and Robustness in Resource Allocation Problems
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
On testing constraint programs
CP'10 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Principles and practice of constraint programming
Constraints
Reformulation based MaxSAT robustness
Constraints
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Bids submitted in auctions are usually treated as enforceable commitments in most bidding and auction theory literature. In reality bidders often withdraw winning bids before the transaction when it is in their best interests to do so. Given a bid withdrawal in a combinatorial auction, finding an alternative repair solution of adequate revenue without causing undue disturbance to the remaining winning bids in the original solution may be difficult or even impossible. We have called this the "Bid-taker's Exposure Problem". When faced with such unreliable bidders, it is preferable for the bid-taker to preempt such uncertainty by having a solution that is robust to bid withdrawal and provides a guarantee that possible withdrawals may be repaired easily with a bounded loss in revenue.In this paper, we propose an approach to addressing the Bid-taker's Exposure Problem. Firstly, we use the Weighted Super Solutions framework [13], from the field of constraint programming, to solve the problem of finding a robust solution. A weighted super solution guarantees that any subset of bids likely to be withdrawn can be repaired to form a new solution of at least a given revenue by making limited changes. Secondly, we introduce an auction model that uses a form of leveled commitment contract [26, 27], which we have called mutual bid bonds, to improve solution reparability by facilitating backtracking on winning bids by the bid-taker. We then examine the trade-off between robustness and revenue in different economically motivated auction scenarios for different constraints on the revenue of repair solutions. We also demonstrate experimentally that fewer winning bids partake in robust solutions, thereby reducing any associated overhead in dealing with extra bidders. Robust solutions can also provide a means of selectively discriminating against distrusted bidders in a measured manner.